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Abstract 
 
This paper presents empirical evidence on the interrelationship 
that exists between the evolution of the Emerging Markets 
Bonds Index (EMBI) and some macroeconomic variables in 
seven Latin American countries; two of them (Ecuador and 
Panama), full dollarized. We make use of a Cointegrated Vector 
framework to analyze the short run effects from 2001 to 2009. 
The results suggest that EMBI is more stable in dollarized 
countries and that its evolution influences economic activity in 
non-dollarized economies; suggesting that investors confidence 
might be higher in dollarized countries where real and financial 
economic evolution are less tied than in non-dollarized ones. 
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4 
1. Introduction 
The global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 had a much smaller impact on emerging Latin 
American markets than on their US and European counterparts. While Latin American countries have 
continued to grow and do not present major macroeconomic imbalances, the advanced economies 
still do not present solid recovery (Figures 1 and 2 jointly with Tables 1 and 2, in Annex 1, show the 
evolution of GDP growth and of the government-debt-to-GDP ratio in the two groups of countries). 
The marginal exposure of banks in emerging markets to US subprime assets and their governments’ 
expansive monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate aggregate demand might explain these differences 
(see Aizenman et al., 2013). However, some authors have analyzed whether exchange rate regimes 
have played a part1.  
 
This paper has two main objectives. The first is to empirically investigate the role of fundamentals in 
the reduced vulnerability to shocks observed in the bond markets of seven Latin American countries, 
and how this reduced vulnerability has in turn affected macroeconomic fundamentals. The second is 
to determine whether there are any differences between countries that can be attributed to their 
exchange rate regime. Specifically, we aim to compare countries with and without a fully-dollarized 
economy. To this end, we empirically assess the relationship between key economic factors such as 
the external debt-to-exports ratio and inflation, and the Emerging Markets Bonds Index (EMBI)2 
during the sample period 2001-2009. In the second stage of the study, we aim to establish whether 
there are relevant differences in the two groups of countries (dollarized and non-dollarized 
economies). 
 
A review of the empirical literature shows that our first question has usually been approached through 
an analysis of the main determinants of country risk premium3. For instance, Edwards (1986) uses 
data on yields of 167 bonds floated by 13 Least Developed Countries (LDC) between 1976 and 1980 
to analyse the factors that determine the country risk premium. He presents evidence that bond 
spreads depend positively on the countries’ level of indebtedness and negatively on the level of 
investment they undertake. He also analyses the behaviour of country risk premium during a debt 
crisis period. Based on monthly spreads of Mexican bonds in the secondary market, he demonstrates 
                                                          
1The results are not conclusive, though. Whilst Krugman (2013) shows how Eurozone members have had more trouble managing their 
debts than countries outside it, Rose (2013) suggests that the exchange rate regime does not matter.  
2The JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bonds Index Global tracks total returns for traded external debt instruments in emerging markets. 
The EMBI Global includes US dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans, and Eurobonds with an outstanding face value of at least $500 
million. Daily historical index levels have been reported since December 31, 1993. See JP Morgan (1999) for more details.  
3Country risk refers to the likelihood that a sovereign state (borrower) may be unable and/or unwilling to meet its obligations towards 
foreign lenders and/or investors (Krayenbuehl, 1985). 
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5 
the positive (negative) relationship between the external debt-to-exports ratio (international reserves-
to-imports ratio) and the country risk premium. Nogués and Grandes (2001), focusing on monthly 
data for Argentina between 1994 and 1998 and estimating its econometric model by OLS, conclude 
that endogenous factors such as the external debt-to-exports ratio, the fiscal deficit, growth 
expectations, contagion effects or political noise are the determinants of Argentina’s country risk. 
Rozada and Yeyati (2008), however, estimating panel error-correction models of emerging spreads on 
high-yield corporate bonds in developed markets and international rates (US Treasury bills) and using 
high frequency (monthly, weekly and daily) data from 33 emerging economies, find that global 
(exogenous) factors explain over 50 per cent of the long run volatility of emerging market spreads.  
 
To sum up, the country risk premium has generally been proxied in the literature by sovereign 
spreads. Specifically, the spread of JP Morgan’s EMBI Global index over US Treasuries bills in Latin 
America countries is the most important reference for prospective investors in this area. 
 
The research so far on the determinants of country risk can be classified in three groups4. First, 
certain authors have found a significant correlation between macroeconomic-political variables and 
the risk premium (Hoti and McAller, 2004; Baldacci et al. 2008; Aizenman et al., 2013). Authors in the 
second group have emphasized the effect of exogenous factors (global factors, contagion effects, 
capital flows or “investor’s sentiment”) on risk premium (Eichengreen and Mody, 1998; Kamin and 
von Kleist, 1999; Schuknecht et al., 2009, 2010). Finally, authors in the third group relate country risk 
and the exchange rate regime. They consider that investors want to know two major components of 
country risk premium: the currency premium, which can be measured as the yield spread between non-
dollar-denominated and US dollar-denominated sovereign debt of the same borrowing country, and 
the credit premium, measured as the yield spread between the dollar-denominated sovereign debt of the 
emerging country and US Treasury bills. There is a certain consensus inside the third group of authors 
that dollarization and hard pegs would substantially reduce the country risk of emerging countries 
(Domowitz et. al., 1998; Rubinstein, 1999; Schmukler, 2002). 
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this branch of the literature by examining the impact of 
macroeconomic fundamentals on risk premium and vice versa, since movements in government bond 
yields may have significant macroeconomic consequences. A rise in sovereign yields tends to be 
                                                          
4The literature on country risk is essentially four decades old. The two pioneering articles were published by Frank and Cline (1971) and 
Feder and Just (1977). Since then, authors have attempted to establish the determinants and the econometric criteria to estimate, 
evaluate, and forecast country risk in different economies. 
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accompanied by a widespread increase in long-term interest rates in the rest of the economy, affecting 
both investment and consumption decisions. On the fiscal side, higher government bond yields imply 
higher debt-servicing costs and can significantly raise funding costs. This could also lead to an 
increase in rollover risk, as debt might have to be refinanced at unusually high cost or, in extreme 
cases, cannot be rolled over at all. Large increases in government funding costs can thus cause real 
economic losses, in addition to the purely financial effects of higher interest rates (see Caceres et al., 
2010). 
 
For this reason, in this paper we will apply a cointegrated Vector Autorregressive (CVAR) approach5 
including proxies of macroeconomic behaviour (captured by endogenous variables) in each country 
and the evolution of its EMBI. Specifically, we focus on seven Latin American countries – two of 
them dollarized economies – in order to analyse the impact of dollarization on country risk premium 
(proxied by the evolution of the EMBI). 
 
The literature on the determinants of EMBI in specific Latin American countries is still scarce. We 
have just found one paper (mainly dissertations or unpublished papers) for each country: Fracasso 
(2007), a good reference for Brazil (he shows that foreign investors’ appetite for risk impacts 
substantially on EMBI spreads)6; Nogués and Grandes (2001) for Argentina, who highlight that 
devaluation risk elimination may not have a statistically significant impact on country risk (other 
macroeconomic variables such as the external debt-to-exports ratio and growth expectations present a 
higher impact); Vargas et al. (2012), for Colombia, who present evidence that improvement of fiscal 
variables reduces the sovereign risk premium; Herrera et al. (2013) for Mexico, who find long-run 
relationships between domestic macroeconomic variables and the Mexican EMBI; Lindao Jurado et al. 
(2009) for Ecuador who conclude that debt and the inflation are the most important factors for 
explaining its country risk; Délano and Selaive (2005), who examine Chilean’s EMBI behaviour and 
conclude that approximately 25% of the variability of the sovereign spread is due to global factors, 
and finally the IMF (2010) which emphasizes that achieving investment grade lowers Panamanian 
debt spreads by over 140 basis points.  
 
                                                          
5Other authors have also applied Vector Autoregressive models. Favero (2013) used a Global VAR to capture time-varying 
interdependence between financial variables by modeling each country’s spread as a function of global spreads. In that article, the 
spreads of the Eurozone co-move due to fiscal fundamentals, global market appetite for risk and expected exchange rate devaluations. 
Jang and Kim (2009) used a VAR model to examine the aggregate determinants of credit spreads and the influence of monetary policy 
shocks on their dynamics in Korea.  
6In financial jargon, the investors’ degree of risk aversion is usually called “investor appetite for risk”. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework while 
Section 3 outlines the data and the econometric model used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 reports 
the main empirical results, comparing dollarized and non-dollarized countries. Finally, Section 5 
presents the main conclusions.  
 
2. Country risk and EMBI determinants 
2.1. The equilibrium condition for a risk-neutral lender 
Following Edwards (1986), in an emerging or developing country that cannot affect the world interest 
rate, the cost of external funds is formed by two concepts: (1) the risk-free world interest rate (i*) and 
(2) a country risk premium (s) related to the probability of default perceived by the lender (p). In the 
case of a one-period loan, where in case of default the lender loses both the principal and the interest, 
the equilibrium condition for a risk-neutral lender is: 
 
                                      (1-p)[1+i*+s] = (1+i*)                                                      (1)                                
  
From here, the country risk premium is: 
 
                                      s= (p/(1-p))k                                                                              (2)                                                                                                               
 
where k= 1+i*. 
 
Since the probability of default depends positively on the debt-to-GDP ratio, as the seminal article by 
Eaton and Gersowitz (1989) demonstrated, the country then faces an upwards-sloping supply curve 
for foreign funds. As the probability of default approaches one, the country risk premium approaches 
infinity and a credit ceiling will be reached. The country in question will have difficulties gaining 
access to the world’s credit market. If the variables that comprise the probability of default perceived 
by lenders were known, the countries might be able to improve them in order to reduce it to zero.  
 
According to Edwards (1986), p has the following logistic function: 
                p = (exp ∑βiXi)/(1+exp∑βiXi)                                                                   (3) 
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8 
where Xi  are the determinants of the sovereign risk premium and βi  are the corresponding 
coefficients. Combining (2) and (3), taking logarithms and adding a random disturbance ε, the 
equation to be estimated is: 
                log s= log k + ∑βiXi + ε                                                                           (4) 
    
The signs of this equation change slightly if the model is described in terms of returns. Transforming 
equation (1), we obtain:  
              (1-p)[1+r*-s] = (1+r*)                                                                                 (5) 
                                                                                      
where r* is the risk-free world return and s represents, this time, the reduction in terms of return on 
the bond investment, and k*=1+r*. Our equation (4) then only changes the signs:  
              log s =  log k* + ∑βiXi + ε                                                                            (6) 
                                                                                                                                                       
Moving terms, we obtain the emerging country return depending on the same determinants of 
country risk: 
        log s - log k* = ∑βiXi + ε                                                                              (7) 
       
 
2.2. Determinants of each country return index 
Both theoretical and empirical studies have highlighted a large number of variables that may affect the 
evolution of government debt returns in emerging countries7. We can split these variables into three 
groups: economic-financial, socio-political, and global factors. 
 
Whereas economic and financial risk factors encompass the major components of country risk, such 
as a sudden deterioration in the country’s terms of trade, the gross domestic product rate of growth, 
the current account-to-GDP ratio, and so on, political and social risk factors emerge from the political 
instability generated in a country by wars, revolutions changing the current government, terrorist 
attacks and other internal or external conflicts8. Social events include civil unrest due to ideological or 
religious differences, or to unequal income distribution (Hoti and McAleer, 2004). The political risk is 
                                                          
7See Hoti and McAller (2004) and Maltritz and Molchanov (2013), which present a summary of the explanatory variables and 
econometric models used in previously published empirical articles. 
8Shanmugam (1990) introduces external conflicts as part of the political determinants due to the spillover effects. For instance, if the 
borrowing country is situated geographically close to a country which is at war, it is likely that the country risk of the borrower country 
will be higher than if its neighbor were at peace. Investors from the peaceful country may identify the inflow of refugees from the 
country in conflict as a problem. However, commercial relations or agreements that might be damaged or interrupted are more 
important facts for investors and/or lenders.   
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9 
usually captured by dummy variables. Finally, global factors are shocks that arise from changes in the 
conditions of international financial markets. They, basically, include the “contagion effect”, a 
significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country according to Forbes and 
Rigobon’s (2002) definition of contagion9, as well as variables that capture the market sentiment10.  
 
Table 3 in Annex 2 details some of the variables used in the empirical literature by a wide range of 
authors to explain the determinants of government debt returns in emerging countries, whilst Table 4 
describes the variables used in our model.  
 
3. Data and empirical approach 
3.1. Data and variables 
The sample comprises seven Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Mexico and Panama from 2001:01 to 2009:12. These countries were selected on the basis of data 
availability and in view of the fact that they are categorized as emerging countries by the IMF (2012). 
As mentioned, Table 4 in Annex 2 provides the description of the variables along with the data 
sources. The finishing date is chosen in order to avoid the influence of the start of the huge global 
economic and financial crisis on emerging economies. We honestly think that it is better to omit data 
corresponding to 2010 from the study because the crisis deserves independent analysis, since from 
that date all the countries examined implemented specific adjustment policies. 
 
We included four endogenous variables in our econometric model. The EMBI (with its monthly 
average calculated from daily data, in order to eliminate its heteroscedasticity and because the rest of 
variables are available at this frequency), along with variables that are only reported monthly, such as 
the Economic Activity Index (eai). This variable was used to measure the growth perspective in the 
case of Argentina, Colombia and Ecuador, while the growth perspective was proxied by the Industrial 
Activity Index (iai) in Mexico, the Industrial Index (ii) in Brazil, the Industrial Production Index (ipi) 
in Chile and, finally, the revenues from taxes to cross the Canal in the case of Panama. In Panama we 
used this variable because all the other sectors of its economy depend on Canal activities, as do other 
markets such as the labour market. The other monthly variables are the inflation rate (inf), which was 
has been calculated from the Consumer Price Index in all the countries, except in Ecuador where it 
                                                          
9
There is considerable ambiguity in the literature concerning the precise definition of contagion (see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 
2014). Concretely, Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) note five definitions, whilst The World Bank summarizes the following three layers of 
definitions: http://go.worldbank.org/JIBDRK3YC0 
10
 Market or investor sentiment is an expectation about future returns and investment risks that is not justified by facts. 
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10 
was directly recorded, and the external debt-to-exports ratio (debt_x), which captures the current 
account solvency of emerging countries.  
 
The purpose of this empirical exercise is to determine the effect of some important fundamentals on 
the evolution of the EMBI in Latin America countries, and to assess how far the behaviour of the 
EMBI also affects fundamentals. This is why, as we explained above, the cointegrated VAR is the 
appropriate econometric approach since all variables in the model are assumed to be endogenous. The 
impact of global risk factors will be captured through the inclusion of dummies.  
 
3.2. Econometric approach: Identification of the short run structure in the Cointegrated VAR 
(CVAR) 
 
Consider the Cointegrated VAR model in the so-called reduced form representation: 
 
∆xt = Г1∆xt-1 + αβ
´xt-1 + ΦDt + εt ,                                  εt ~ IN(0, Ω)                        (8) 
 
The cointegration relationships (β´xt-1) are identified as r long run simultaneous relationships between 
p1 variables (the dimension of xt-1) which enter in the relationships with the same index. In order to 
identify the long run structure (αβ´xt-1) we have to impose restrictions on each of the cointegrating 
relations. Ri denotes a p1 x mi restriction matrix and Hi a p1 x si design matrix. Thus, there are mi 
restrictions and si parameters to be estimated in the ith relation. Hi = Ri┴. The cointegrating relations 
are assumed to satisfy the restrictions βc = {H1φ1,..., Hrφr} where φi are si x 1 matrices of unrestricted 
coefficients.  
Pre-multiplying (8) with a non singular p x p matrix A0, we obtain the so-called structural form 
representation: 
 
A0∆xt = A1∆xt-1 + aβ
´xt-1 + A0ΦDt + vt ,                          vt ~ INp(0, Σ)                       (9)    
where A1=A0Г1, a=A0α, vt=A0εt 
  
The short run equations consist of p equations between p current variables, ∆xt, p(k-1) lagged 
variables (∆xt-i  i=1….,k-1), and r lagged equilibrium errors, (β
c)´xt-1. Identification of the r long run 
relationships requires at least r-1 restrictions on each relationship, while identification of the 
simultaneous short run structure of the p equations requires at least p-1 restrictions on each equation.  
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Keeping the properly identified cointegrating relationships fixed at their estimated values, i.e. by 
treating (βc)´xt-1  as predetermined stationary regressors, as in the case of ∆xt-i, it is easier to identify the 
simultaneous short run structure. We identify the long run relationships first, and then the short run 
adjustment parameters. 
 
The unrestricted short run reduced form model is identified exactly by the p-1 zero restrictions on 
each row of A0=I. Further zero restrictions on Г1, α and Φ are over-identifying. Thus, the process of 
identification consists firstly in individually testing whether all lagged variables, the long run structure, 
and dummy variables are statistically significant in the system. The next step is to remove the non-
significant variables from the system, so that the generally identified model only contains significant 
coefficients. The significant coefficients will identify the short run adjustment parameters and the long 
run relationships that affect the dependent variables of our simultaneous equations system which is 
estimated by maximum likelihood11.  
 
                                                          
11This section relies heavily on Juselius (2006).  
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Econometric steps 
First, we estimated an unrestricted VAR for each country with the following structure: Xt=[EMBI, 
eai, inf, debt_x]. Previously, all the variables were transformed into logarithms except inflation; recall 
from section 3.1 that the variable capturing the growth expectations (eai) changes depending on the 
country in question.  
 
Second, we carried out the residual analysis shown properly in Table 5 in Annex 3; only by including 
dummies with which we were able to obtain residuals that were uncorrelated, normal and without 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH effects)12. To obtain normality it was necessary to include different 
permanent dummies which take the value 1 for the reference date and zero otherwise. Here we detail 
the dummies included for each country: 
 
Argentina: The dummy dum0111p (2001:11) takes into account the significant fall in the Global 
EMBI due to the currency crisis sparked by Argentina’s abandoning of the currency board, following 
public debt default13. Dum0202p and dum0204p variables capture the consequences of devaluation 
that generated inflation pressures (CEPAL, 2002). The dum0504p was included to normalize debt_x 
residuals since at that date external debt experienced a sharp decrease when Argentina launched a debt 
exchange in 200514. Brazil: dum0211p is included to normalize the debt_x residuals. After the 1999 
devaluation on the public debt denominated in US dollars, Brazil’s debt increased substantially, 
reaching 50% of total public debt at the end of 200215. Colombia: The objective of dum0405p is to 
normalize the EMBI residuals; three dummies dum0901p, dum0904p and dum0907p represent the 
impact of the 2008-2009 global crisis on Colombia’s economic activity (CEPAL, 2009). Chile: 
dum0405p which normalizes the EMBI residuals and the dum0901p which normalizes the economic 
activity variable (ipi) are incorporated in the analysis. Mexico: dum0405p is introduced in order to 
eliminate the outliers of EMBI residuals. Ecuador: Five permanent dummies need to be included. 
One of them, dum0906p, is explained in detail in Marí Del Cristo and Gómez Puig (2013)16. To these 
variables we add dum0811p to jointly explain the debt_x and the EMBI evolution. The rest of 
                                                          
12The first and second steps were performed using the software CATS.  
13In April 1991 the Convertibility Plan was launched, which pegged the peso 1-to-1 to the US dollar. This plan was replaced with a dual 
exchange rate regime based on an official exchange rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar for public sector and tradable transactions, while other 
transactions were conducted at market rates. By June 2002 the exchange rate reached 4 pesos per dollar (see Kaminsky et al., 2009 and 
Mourelle, 2010). 
14See Hornbeck (2013). 
15See Giambiagi and Ronci (2004). 
16In June 2009 the Correa government defaulted on $3.2 billion of foreign public debt, and then completed a buyback of 91 per cent of 
the defaulted bonds (Sandoval, 2009).  
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dummies are dum0109p and dum0301p which are needed to normalize inflation residuals17. Panama: 
The dum0401p normalizes residuals of inflation. Prices decreased in the first quarter of 2004, but the 
trend reverted afterward due to the rise in oil prices and other import products (CEPAL, 2004).   
 
The dum0810p (along with dum0811p only for Ecuador) is common to all the endogenous variables 
since it is related to the start of the world financial crisis (the US financial institution Lehman Brothers 
collapsed in September 2008 and affected the EMBI evolution of all emerging countries included in 
this study).  Dummies such as dum0405p and dum0901p might explain contagion effects between 
Chile, Colombia and Mexico18. Dum0405p captures the incidence of global factors such as a fall in 
international interest rates, which we can proxy using the US Treasury 10-year yield19 (Fig. 3 in Annex 
1 shows that Treasury bonds yields went down in 2004:05). Following Eichengreen and Mody (1998), 
we assume that the relationship between the US Treasury bond rates and emerging bond prices is 
explained in terms of demand20. On the demand side, when Treasury bonds rates go up (their prices 
go down), there will be a tendency among investors to substitute emerging bonds by US Treasury 
bonds, and so the EMBI price falls. Finally, dummy dum0901p represents the vulnerability of 
Colombia and Chile with respect to the other countries included in the sample during the global 
economic crisis of 2008-2009.  
 
Third, we determined the rank of cointegration; Table 6 in Annex 3 shows the results of Johansen’s 
(1996) test, which concludes that all the countries reflect the presence of just one cointegrated vector; 
so the rank of their long run matrix is equal to 1 (except Panama’s, which is r=2).  
 
Fourth, we test and impose over-identifying restrictions on the long run structure (beta vectors) in 
order to have only significant coefficients. Table 7 in Annex 3 shows the tests of exclusion for the 
seven countries, and Table 8 in the same Annex displays the final cointegration relationships for each 
of the countries. These long run relationships will be added as another predetermined variable into 
the simultaneous equation system and, along with dummies and lagged differenced variables, we will 
test whether their coefficients are significant or not.  
                                                          
17 Inflation only achieved a stable level in Ecuador after the first quarter of 2003 (see Marí del Cristo and Gómez-Puig, 2013)  
18Several articles have presented empirical evidence of contagion effects within these countries. For instance, based on the estimation of 
a multivariate regression model, Mathur et al. (2002) conclude that there were spillover contagion effects from the Mexican market to 
the Chilean market during the 1994 peso crisis. Moreover, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) study whether capital controls affect the 
link between domestic and foreign stock market prices and interest rates, and find that equity prices are more internationally linked than 
interest rates.  
19McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) find high correlations of common factors with S&P500, US Treasury yield curve and oil prices.  
20
On the supply side, when Treasury bond rates go up, the increased debt servicing cost decreases the supply of US external debt. This 
in turn increases the price of emerging bonds averaged by the EMBI. 
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Finally as a fifth step, we test the CVAR model as a simultaneous equation system. Its results are 
summarized in Tables 9a to 9g in Annex 4. We present the significance of the t-values for the 
different coefficients in order to highlight the differences between the countries21 – specifically, 
between dollarized and non-dollarized countries.  
 
4.2. Interpretation of the results 
As mentioned, the results of the parameter estimations that describe the short run effects over 
variables are presented in Tables 9a to 9g in Annex 4. Specifically, Tables 9a to 9e correspond to non-
dollarized countries and Tables 9f and 9g to the dollarized ones (Ecuador and Panama). In these 
tables, the presence of t-values makes it easy to distinguish between significant and non-significant 
coefficients across the seven emerging countries in the sample.  
 
The case of Argentina is illustrated in Table 9a. It is shown that EMBI_arg is influenced by its own 
shocks and by the dummies dum0810p and dum0111p, meaning that global factors are more 
important than fundamentals in explaining EMBI movements. The economic activity is only affected 
by the EMBI lagged one period in the short run. Inflation is affected not only by its own shocks, in 
the short run, but in the long run as well. Finally, the variable Ldebt_x is affected by EMBI_arg, 
suggesting that EMBI_arg is a good indicator for investors making decisions about their sovereign 
bond investments. Besides, dum0504p is significant when explaining Argentina’s solvency. 
Furthermore, there are three events in which the movements were stronger than at other dates, as 
dum0204p, dum0202p and dum0504p show. Similarly, in the Brazilian case, shown in Table 9b, the 
EMBI_br follows the same path as EMBI_arg: global factors captured by dummy variables 
dum0810p and dum0211p are more important for these two large countries than fundamentals – or at 
least the fundamentals included in this study. The economic activity is affected by the EMBI lagged 
one period, its own shocks, inflation and a long run relationship of economic cycles. Inflation has 
short run impacts from its own shocks and economic activity, and it also adjusts to that long run 
relationship. Besides, both EMBI and economic cycle (the latter proxied by the industrial index 
variable DLii) lagged one period affect the debt of the next period. Moreover, debt is adjusting to a 
long run relationship lagged two periods. Table 9c describes the results for Colombia. The EMBI_co 
is affected not only by global factors, captured by dum0810p and dum0405p, but also by the 
fundamental variable DLIMACO_1.The variable capturing the economic movements is affected by 
                                                          
21This econometric work was carried out with the software Ox Metrics.  
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almost all the predetermined variables: DLEMBI_co, DLIMACO, and DLdebt_x, in the short run, 
and by a long run relationship based on the EMBI_co path. The dummy dum0810p also exerts an 
impact over inflation and, finally, the solvency of Colombia (proxied by the external debt-to-exports 
ratio) is only affected by its own shocks. Estimations for Chile are shown in Table 9d. The EMBI_ch 
adjusts to the long run relationship -this involves the country’s payment capacity (Ldebt_x), the 
EMBI_ch and inflation variables- and, as in the other emerging countries global factors represent a 
large part of its changes. Chile’s inflation co-moves along with activity, EMBI_ch and its own shocks. 
Finally, the significant coefficients of EMBI_ch, debt_x and inflation should be highlighted as 
variables which affect the country’s debt in the short run. Table 9e displays the results for Mexico, 
another important, large, emerging country. The results suggest that the EMBI_mx variable is affected 
by inflation and global factors (dum0810p and dum0405p) during the sample period. Both 
fundamental and financial factors (the economic cycle, debt, inflation and EMBI_mx) have an impact 
on activity (DLiai). It is noticeable that in the Mexican case, inflation is affected by all the variables in 
the short run whilst the Debt_x variable is influenced by EMBI_mx_3 in the short run and by 
inflation in the long run.  
 
In the case of Ecuador (Table 9f), the first dollarized country in this empirical investigation, the 
results show that not only the global factors (dum0810p, dum0812p), but also the level of debt_x 
affect the evolution of the EMBI. Indeed, there is a bi-directional dependence between debt_x and 
EMBI, as the significant coefficient of EMBI_ec in the DLdebt_x equation shows. We also find that 
both economic activity and inflation are not affected by fundamentals except their own shocks, and 
economic activity in the case of inflation. Finally, the second dollarized country in this comparison of 
seven Latin American countries is Panama, whose results are presented in Table 9g. EMBI_pa adjusts 
equally to its first long run relationship and, as in the other emerging countries, is affected by global 
factors (dum0810p). The revenues from taxes to cross the Canal, which proxy the economic activity 
cycles, are affected by inflation and by the first cointegrated vector whilst inflation adjusts to the 
second long run relationship and DLdebt_x_1 and EMBI_pa are the variables whose shocks have an 
impact on it. Lastly, Panama’s debt_x relationship adjusts to the second cointegrated vector, and is 
affected by inflation in the short run.  
 
Table 10 in Annex 4 presents the comparative analysis of the seven emerging countries. Looking 
across the columns in Tables 9a to 9g in Annex 4, the following conclusions can be drawn: (1) The 
Emerging Bond Market Index (EMBI) is generally affected by global factors (proxied by dum0810p 
which captures the beginning of the financial crisis) and their own shocks, since all the countries in 
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the sample, except Colombia, have a significant lagged DLEMBI coefficient in their EMBI equations. 
Debt_x does not seem to be relevant for explaining the EMBI behaviour, unless a country has 
defaulted on its debt obligations (as Ecuador did); (2) Economic activity is affected by the EMBI in all 
countries but dollarized ones; which represents the first important finding of this study, suggesting 
that in non-dollarized countries, debt-servicing costs may have an important impact on the evolution 
of the economy; (3) In most cases, inflation follows a long run relationship. In our opinion, this is the 
second important finding of this research, since it means that a country does not need to be dollarized 
to reach stable inflation levels. Inflation targeting might be behind the non-dollarized countries’ 
results; (4) In general, investors look at the evolution of the EMBI to make their next decisions 
regarding sovereign bond debt investment. Colombia and Panama are the exceptions; (5) In general, 
the EMBI does not follow a long run relationship (with the exception of Chile and Panama), whilst 
Debt_x does, except for Argentina, Colombia, and Ecuador; (6) Finally, it seems that contagion 
effects are present in only three countries: Colombia, Chile, and Mexico. These inter-relationships are 
captured by dum0405p and dum0901p variables. The former affects the EMBI in the three countries, 
whilst the latter affects the economic activity in just the first two countries.  
 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
The empirical literature has followed the interesting and recent economic trends taking place in 
various parts of the world that are still dealing with the effects of the global crisis of 2008-2009. 
Surprisingly, the emerging countries have performed much better than their US and European 
counterparts in both financial and macroeconomic sectors. One of the key questions, then, is whether 
the relationships between fundamentals and financial variables play a role in reducing vulnerability to 
external shocks.  
 
This paper had two main objectives: first, to empirically investigate the role of fundamentals in the 
reduced vulnerability to shocks of emerging countries’ bond markets, and then in turn to assess the 
effect of this reduced vulnerability on macroeconomic fundamentals; and second, to determine 
whether there are any differences between countries depending on their exchange rate regime. 
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Concretely, using monthly data from seven Latin American countries for the 2001-2009 period, we 
conclude that the EMBI, the general reference of country risk for investors in emerging countries, has 
basically been determined by global factors: specifically, the impact of the outbreak of the recent 
financial crisis. Debt is a less important determinant, unless the country in question has defaulted on 
its obligations. However, the evolution of the EMBI does influence investors in taking decisions 
regarding their next debt investments. As for contagion effects, they have not affected all the 
countries, in fact, they have affected only three of them, Colombia, Chile and Mexico which is 
consistent with the results presented by Mathur et al. (2002) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001), 
among others.  
 
Finally, the two main findings of this paper are: (i) economic activity is affected by the EMBI in all the 
countries except the dollarized ones; and (ii) inflation follows a long run relationship for most of the 
sample (the exceptions being Colombia and Chile), showing that a country does not need to be 
dollarized to achieve a stable inflation level.  
 
Our results suggest that in Latin America countries the pricing of risk (EMBI) depends mostly on 
global factors. Nevertheless, its evolution affects foreign lenders’ prospective debt investments, as 
well as domestic economic activity, except in dollarized countries. These results may suggest the 
following conclusions. First, dollarization may ensure that currency mismatches will not occur during 
domestic economic crises; thus, the EMBI is more stable and these countries’ access to debt markets 
is easier due to their lower vulnerability to EMBI shocks. Second, dollarized countries are not as 
dependent on international reserves (they use the US dollar both to develop their economies and to 
pay their debts), as their non-dollarized counterparts which need international reserves to pay their 
debts but use national currencies to develop their economies. This comparative analysis between two 
dollarized and five non-dollarized countries suggests that dollarization may isolate the evolution of the 
broadest emerging market debt benchmark, the EMBI. Therefore, these economies may in a way be 
isolated from investors’ sentiments and more exposed to fundamentals. Besides, our results also 
suggest that in the long run, non-dollarized countries with inflation targeting policies achieve similar 
levels of inflation to those obtained by their dollarized counterparts. This result is consistent with 
those presented by other authors [see, for instance, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke 
(1999)]. The novelty is to reach this conclusion by means of the cointegrated VAR approach which 
identifies long-run relationships, including a stationary inflation variable in non-dollarized countries.  
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Annex 1: Latin American and developed countries evolution (2001-2010).  
 
Latin American countries’ evolution. 
 
Fig. 1. Total Central Government Debt-to-GDP ratio (%).  
 
 
 
Table 1. Annual GDP rate of growth. 
Year Argentina Brazil Colombia Chile Mexico Ecuador Panama 
        
2001 -4.45 1.31 1.71 3.35 -0.03 3.97 0.00 
2002 -10.84 2.65 2.48 2.19 0.77 4.11 2.40 
2003 8.76 1.15 3.91 3.92 1.39 2.82 4.68 
2004 9.03 5.71 5.34 6.03 4.21 8.24 7.46 
2005 9.18 3.15 4.71 5.60 3.07 5.32 6.94 
2006 8.51 3.95 6.68 4.58 4.97 4.33 8.44 
2007 8.65 6.09 6.90 4.53 3.22 2.07 12.57 
2008 6.71 5.17 3.59 3.67 1.37 6.33 10.10 
2009 0.86 -0.33 1.61 -0.99 -4.74 0.63 3.86 
2010 9.16 7.53 3.97 5.73 5.20 3.59 7.44 
2011 8.86 2.73 6.67 5.89 3.83 7.75 10.82 
2012 1.88 1.02 4.20 5.50 3.94 5.11 10.93 
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Evolution of the US and European countries.   
 
Fig. 2. Total Central Government Debt-to-GDP ratio (%).  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Annual GDP rate of growth. 
 
Year Belgium France Greece Ireland Italy Portugal United States 
2001 0.80 1.83 4.19 4.98 1.86 1.97 0.94 
2002 1.35 0.92 3.43 5.41 0.45 0.76 1.77 
2003 0.80 0.89 5.94 3.72 -0.04 -0.91 2.79 
2004 3.27 2.54 4.36 4.19 1.73 1.56 3.79 
2005 1.75 1.82 2.28 6.08 0.93 0.77 3.35 
2006 2.66 2.46 5.50 5.50 2.19 1.44 2.66 
2007 2.88 2.28 3.53 4.97 1.68 2.36 1.78 
2008 0.98 -0.08 -0.21 -2.16 -1.15 -0.01 -0.29 
2009 -2.80 -3.14 -3.13 -6.38 -5.49 -2.90 -2.80 
2010 2.32 1.72 -4.94 -1.06 1.72 1.93 2.50 
2011 1.76 2.02 -7.10 2.16 0.47 -1.25 1.84 
2012 -0.13 0.01 -6.37 0.15 -2.53 -3.22 2.77 
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Fig 3. US Treasury 10 year bond rate evolution (Monthly data 2001-2009) 
US Treasury bonds rate 
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Annex 2: Determinants of sovereign returns in emerging countries.  
 
Table 3. Variables used in the literature on sovereign returns' analysis in emerging countries. 
    
Economic and financial variables 
Variable Description/Authors 
 
 
Debt-to-GDP ratio 
The most important variable, since in most theoretical models of 
foreign borrowing it is included as an important triggering factor to 
borrowers to default (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Edwards, 1986, 
1986). It has also been included in empirical studies (Aizenman et al., 
2013; Eichengreen and Mody, 1998).  
 
International reserves to GNP 
or GDP 
Measures the solvency held by a country. (See Edwards, 1986; 
Aizenman et al., 2013; and Rowland and Torres, 2004, to name a 
few). 
 
Investment-to-GNP/GDP 
ratio; GDP per capita growth;  
Industrial production. 
These variables capture the country’s prospects for future growth. 
There are other variables used in the literature, though, such as the 
growth rate measured by the difference between the logs of GDP in 
time t and t-1. (See Nogués and Grandes, 2001; Edwards 1986 or  
Aizenman et al., 2013)  
Current account-to-
GNP/GDP ratio 
Solvency variables. (See Edwards, 1986; Nogués and Grandes, 2001; 
or Aizenman et al., 2013). 
External debt service- to- 
exports ratio; External debt- 
to- GDP ratio;  External debt- 
to- exports. 
These variables capture the intertemporal liquidity situation of a 
country. (Edwards, 1986; Nogués and Grandes, 2001; Aizenman et 
al., 2013 and Rowland and Torres, 2004).  
Imports-to- GNP ratio; Trade 
openness (Exports plus 
Imports) % of GDP; Terms of 
trade  
These variables gauge the importance of trade. (See Edwards, 1986; 
Aizenman et al., 2013; or Balacci et al., 2008) 
Index of real effective 
exchange rate 
See Edwards, 1986; or Rozada and Yeyati, 2008.  
 
Fiscal balance- to- GDP ratio.  
This variable measures the country's fiscal sustainability. (See Nogués 
and Grandes, 2001; Rozada and Yeyati, 2008; or Baldacci et al. 2008). 
Inflation rate See Baldacci et al., 2008; or Aizenman et al., 2013.  
 
Social and political variables 
Variable Description/Authors 
 
 
Political noise 
Nogués and Grandes (2001) focused on Argentina and tested the 
political noise associated with the resignation of the Minister Cavallo 
through a dummy variable that took the value 1 in the period of 
uncertainty that led to his resignation.  
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Global factors 
Variable Description/Authors 
 
External financial shocks 
Nogués and Grandes (2001) capture them using the rate of the 30-
year US Treasury bonds, whilst Rozada and Yeyati (2008) use the 10-
year US Treasury rate.   
 
 
 
 
 
Contagion effects 
They can be captured either by dummies or by variables such as other 
countries' returns. For instance, Nogues and Grandes (2001) included 
the JP Morgan Price index of Mexican bonds to measure its 
relationship with the country risk of Argentina. They expected that 
the historical similarities (in terms of economic policy and response 
to external shocks) between Mexico and Argentina would result in a 
similar behaviour of their governments' returns, beyond fundamental-
based reasons.  
 
Market sentiment  
Diaz Weigel and Gemmill (2006) analyse a sample of emerging 
countries using variables such as US and regional stock returns or oil 
prices as proxies of global factors and market sentiment.  
 
 
 
  Table 4. Variables used in our comparative study.  
Variable Observations Source 
  
LEMBI_country 
Monthly average has been 
calculated from daily reported JP 
Morgan EMBI.   
Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEAI, LIAI, LII, LIPI, LREV  
(These variables represent 
growth expectations. The 
variable used depends on data 
availability in each country). 
 
 
 
LEAI: Economic activity index in 
Argentina, Colombia and Ecuador.  
LIAI: Industrial activity index in 
Mexico.  
LII: Industrial Index in Brazil. 
LIPI: Industrial production index 
in Chile.  
LREV: Revenues from taxes levied 
in the Panama Canal.  
 
Argentina: Statistical National 
Institute (www.indec.mecon.ar) 
Brazil: Brazilian Statistical and 
Geographical Institute 
(www.ibge.gov.br) 
Colombia: Central Bank of 
Colombia Republic 
(www.banrep.gov.co) 
Chile: National Statistical Institute 
(www.ine.cl) 
Ecuador: Central Bank 
(www.bce.ec) 
Mexico: National Statistical and 
Geographical Institute (www. 
Inegi.org.mx) 
Panama: National Contraloria 
(www.contraloria.gob.pa)  
 
 
INF 
Inflation statistics in the case of 
Ecuador, but in the rest of the 
countries the difference in the 
Consumer Prices Index is used 
 
Ecuador: Central Bank  
Rest of countries: CEPAL.  
 
LDEBT_X 
 
External debt-to-exports ratio 
 
Economic Commission of the 
Latin American and Caribbean 
countries (CEPAL) 
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Annex 3. Preliminary tests.  
 
Table. 5. Residual Analysis 
 
Argentina 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(16)  =  14.977 [0.526] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(16)  =  15.357 [0.499] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(100) = 107.723 [0.281] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(200) = 214.580 [0.228] 
 
Univariate Statistics 
                                Mean    Std.Dev   Skewness  Kurtosis Maximum   Minimum 
DLEMBI_M_ARG     -0.000      0.052            -0.566          3.742            0.099           -0.170 
DLEAI                         0.000      0.014            -0.070          2.927           0.033            -0.034 
DINF                          -0.000      0.211             0.300           3.808          0.698            -0.560 
DLDEBT_X                 0.000     0.064             0.103          4.942            0.190           -0.244 
 
                                        ARCH(2)         Normality          R-Squared 
DLEMBI_M_ARG        3.732 [0.155]        5.806  [0.055]                 0.697 
DLEAI                           0.252 [0.881]        0.204  [0.903]                 0.945 
DINF                            12.131 [0.002]        4.875  [0.087]                0.852 
DLDEBT_X                  1.473 [0.479]      17.219  [0.000]                 0.416 
 
 
 
Brazil 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(16)  =  12.508 [0.708] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(16)  =  21.238 [0.170] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(100) = 117.024 [0.117] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(200) = 230.838 [0.067] 
 
Univariate Statistics 
                              Mean    Std.Dev     Skewness  Kurtosis Maximum   Minimum 
DLEMBI_M_BRA    0.000         0.039           -0.665            4.135          0.088             -0.115 
DLII                         -0.000         0.051          -0.034             2.850          0.128            -0.139 
DINF                         0.000         0.144           0.168              3.523         0.384            -0.417 
DLDEBT_X              0.000         0.101          -0.100             3.359          0.268            -0.273 
 
                                      ARCH(3)         Normality          R-Squared 
DLEMBI_M_BRA        6.537 [0.088]         7.799  [0.020]               0.353 
DLII                               0.337 [0.953]        0.048  [0.976]               0.417 
DINF                             1.399 [0.706]         2.892  [0.236]               0.516 
DLDEBT_X                  5.180 [0.159]         1.851  [0.396]               0.336 
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Colombia 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(16)  =  17.635 [0.346] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(16)  =  18.685 [0.285] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(100) = 116.696 [0.122] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(200) = 228.552 [0.081] 
 
 
Univariate Statistics 
                            Mean    Std.Dev    Skewness  Kurtosis  Maximum   Minimum 
DLEMBI_CO    -0.000      0.023      -0.510         3.737      0.061          -0.070 
DLDEBT_X       0.000       0.078      0.123          3.412      0.203          -0.202 
DLIMACO         0.000       0.125       0.045         4.314      0.415           -0.379 
DINF                -0.000       0.156       0.250         3.082      0.456           -0.400 
 
                                   ARCH(2)         Normality      R-Squared 
DLEMBI_CO        2.497 [0.287]     5.191  [0.075]         0.501 
DLDEBT_X          1.316 [0.518]     2.178  [0.337]         0.553 
DLIMACO             1.075 [0.584]     9.972  [0.007]        0.887 
DINF                     0.783 [0.676]      1.328  [0.515]        0.661 
 
 
Chile 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(16)  =  31.760 [0.011] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(16)  =   9.406 [0.896] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(100) = 113.875 [0.162] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(200) = 182.715 [0.804] 
 
Univariate Statistics 
                          Mean    Std.Dev     Skewness  Kurtosis Maximum   Minimum 
DLEMBI_CH        0.000        0.018             -0.148           3.244          0.049            -0.057 
DLIPI                    0.000        0.027              -0.131           2.921         0.057            -0.073 
DINF                    -0.000        0.264              0.202            3.485         0.768            -0.673 
DLDEBT_X         -0.000        0.087              0.014           2.597          0.201            -0.210 
 
                               ARCH(3)         Normality          R-Squared 
DLEMBI_CH          6.776 [0.079]         1.367  [0.505]              0.632 
DLIPI                      1.186 [0.756]          0.389 [0.823]              0.858 
DINF                       0.208 [0.976]         2.704  [0.259]              0.609 
DLDEBT_X            0.848 [0.838]         0.252  [0.882]              0.608 
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Mexico 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(16)  =  24.217 [0.085] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(16)  =  26.980 [0.042] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(100) = 135.255 [0.011] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(200) = 218.177 [0.180] 
 
Univariate Statistics 
                              Mean    Std.Dev      Skewness  Kurtosis Maximum   Minimum 
DLEMBI_MX          -0.000          0.014             -0.375          3.625           0.038             -0.043 
DIAI                         -0.000          2.028              0.162          3.174            5.854            -5.179 
DINF                         0.000          0.193             -0.336          2.706           0.390             -0.540 
DLDEBT_X              0.000          0.070              0.320          3.567            0.235            -0.146 
 
                                ARCH(4)         Normality          R-Squared 
DLEMBI_MX         8.903 [0.064]        3.879  [0.144]                0.654 
DIAI                      16.944 [0.002]         1.125  [0.570]               0.547 
DINF                     11.197 [0.024]         2.921  [0.232]               0.558 
DLDEBT_X            7.688 [0.104]         3.403  [0.182]               0.409 
 
 
Ecuador 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(16)  =  13.456 [0.639] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(16)  =  12.525 [0.707] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(100) =  77.364 [0.955] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(200) = 178.660 [0.859] 
 
Univariate Statistics 
                                Mean    Std.Dev      Skewness  Kurtosis Maximum   Minimum 
DLEMBI_M_EC        -0.000        0.046             -0.858            4.242          0.097             -0.164 
DLEAI                        0.000         0.063               0.002           2.843           0.166            -0.144 
DINF                          0.000         0.003               0.051           2.838            0.007           -0.006 
DLDEBT_X                0.000        0.073               0.330           3.110           0.225            -0.175 
 
                                   ARCH(2)           Normality          R-Squared 
DLEMBI_M_EC       9.820 [0.007]          12.068  [0.002]            0.741 
DLEAI                       1.248 [0.536]            0.021  [0.990]            0.663 
DINF                         2.059 [0.357]            0.065  [0.968]            0.775 
DLDEBT_X              4.122 [0.127]            2.100  [0.350]            0.469 
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Panama 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(16)  =  33.712 [0.006] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(16)  =  12.591 [0.702] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(100) = 133.607 [0.014] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(200) = 262.105 [0.002] 
 
Univariate Statistics 
                                      Mean    Std.Dev     Skewness  Kurtosis  Maximum   Minimum 
DLEMBI_M_PANA           0.000        0.017            -0.444             3.452         0.031              -0.058 
DLREV_C                          -0.000        0.036            -0.143             3.307        0.091               -0.104 
DINF                                  -0.000        0.349             0.006             2.946        0.832               -0.954 
DLDEBT_X                        0.000        0.131            -0.358             3.283        0.285               -0.410 
 
                                         ARCH(2)         Normality          R-Squared 
DLEMBI_M_PANA        1.942 [0.379]         3.805  [0.149]              0.614 
DLREV_C                        0.118 [0.943]         1.647  [0.439]              0.745 
DINF                                3.593 [0.166]         0.162  [0.922]              0.634 
DLDEBT_X                     0.335 [0.846]         2.609  [0.271]              0.617 
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Table 6. Johansen tests 
 
Argentina                      Brazil 
 p-r r Eig.Value  Trace  Trace*  Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
  4  0      0.506    108.329 101.441   47.707   0.000      0.000 
  3  1      0.218      34.375  32.146    29.804   0.013      0.026 
  2  2      0.076       8.605     7.860    15.408   0.410      0.488 
  1  3      0.003       0.313     0.270      3.841   0.576      0.603 
p-r r Eig.Value Trace  Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
  4  0     0.347     78.969  72.529  47.707    0.000      0.000 
  3  1     0.204     34.590  32.763  29.804    0.012      0.021 
  2  2     0.099     10.869  10.378  15.408    0.223      0.257 
  1  3     0.000       0.018    0.017    3.841    0.894     0.896 
 
Colombia                    Chile  
p-r r Eig.Value  Trace  Trace*  Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
  4  0     0.451   108.706 104.035    47.707   0.000       0.000 
  3  1     0.254     45.788   39.445   29.804    0.000       0.002 
  2  2     0.122     15.088   12.985   15.408    0.056       0.116 
  1  3     0.014       1.481     1.323     3.841    0.224       0.250 
p-r r Eig.Value Trace  Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
  4  0     0.271     52.125 49.204   47.707      0.017    0.035 
  3  1     0.131     19.239 18.217   29.804      0.487    0.560 
  2  2     0.037       4.696   4.139   15.408      0.837    0.886 
  1  3     0.007       0.741   0.549     3.841      0.389    0.459 
 
Mexico                         Ecuador 
p-r r Eig.Value Trace  Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
  4  0     0.375     74.024   67.332  47.707    0.000      0.000 
  3  1     0.141     25.549   23.741  29.804    0.147      0.219 
  2  2     0.089       9.849    8.448   15.408    0.298      0.426 
  1  3     0.003       0.303    0.283     3.841    0.582      0.595 
p-r r Eig.Value Trace  Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
  4  0     0.289     66.145  61.757   47.707      0.000      0.001 
  3  1     0.195     29.970  28.117   29.804      0.048      0.078 
  2  2     0.064      6.956    6.563    15.408      0.589      0.634 
  1  3     0.000       0.001   0.001      3.841      0.970      0.972 
 
Panama 
p-r r Eig.Value Trace  Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
  4  0     0.323    83.576   79.508   47.707     0.000      0.000 
  3  1     0.235    42.641   40.886   29.804     0.001      0.001 
  2  2     0.128    14.546   13.868   15.408     0.068      0.086 
  1  3     0.001      0.104     0.099     3.841     0.747      0.754 
 
 
Table 7. Exclusion tests 
 
Argentina                                   Brazil 
 r  DGF  5% C.V. LEMBI_M_ARG      LEAI          INF       LDEBT_X           r DGF  5% C.V. LEMBI_M_BRA  LII     INF   LDEBT_X   TREND 
 
 1   1         3.841        0.177                0.160       46.649           0.148 
                                [0.674]              [0.689]      [0.000]         [0.701] 
 2   2         5.991      15.169                1.422        61.128          3.340 
                                [0.001]              [0.491]      [0.000]         [0.188] 
 3   3         7.815      21.412                8.798        64.226         11.312  
                                [0.000]              [0.032]      [0.000]         [0.010] 
 
 1   1    3.841           1.682          8.402     9.067       2.262        1.309 
                              [0.195]       [0.004]   [0.003]     [0.133]      [0.253] 
 2   2    5.991           4.477        21.536   23.366       5.754         4.234 
                              [0.107]       [0.000]   [0.000]     [0.056]      [0.120] 
 3   3    7.815         12.327         32.972   34.786     15.161        5.681 
                              [0.006]        [0.000]   [0.000]     [0.002]     [0.128] 
 
Colombia                                   Chile  
r  DGF  5% C.V.     LEMBI_ CO  LIMACO         INF         LDEBT_X           
1   1         3.841      6.244                11.050         2.505             3.386 
                              [0.012]              [0.001]       [0.113]           [0.066] 
 2   2         5.991      6.793                18.160      17.016             3.791 
                              [0.033]              [0.000]       [0.000]           [0.150] 
 3   3         7.815    18.919               30.095       29.017            15.027  
                              [0.000]              [0.000]       [0.000]           [0.002] 
r  DGF  5% C.V.       LEMBI_CH      LIPI          INF          LDEBT_X    
 1   1        3.841            3.280         10.785     12.279              4.749 
                                   [0.070]        [0.001]     [0.000]            [0.029]   
 2   2        5.991            5.856         16.712     18.250              8.666 
                                   [0.053]        [0.000]     [0.000]            [0.013] 
 3   3        7.815            8.233         19.840     21.572            12.050  
                                   [0.041]        [0.000]     [0.000]            [0.007] 
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Mexico                                      Ecuador 
r  DGF  5% C.V.   LEMBI_MX       IAI               INF           LDEBT_X           
 1   1        3.841         0.002          0.015        32.296               0.726 
                                [0.961]       [0.904]        [0.000]             [0.394] 
 2   2        5.991         1.885          0.048        38.251               4.239 
                                [0.390]       [0.976]        [0.000]             [0.120]   
 3   3        7.815         9.470          8.479        47.469              13.480  
                                [0.024]        [0.037]       [0.000]             [0.004]   
 
r  DGF  5% C.V.    LEMBI_M_EC    LEAI         INF        LDEBT_X    
 1   1         3.841          1.391            0.019     32.046            0.176 
                                 [0.238]          [0.891]    [0.000]           [0.675]   
 2   2         5.991          1.429          10.899     40.450            9.598  
                                 [0.490]          [0.004]    [0.000]           [0.008]  
 3   3         7.815        10.337          20.355     47.864           15.872  
                                 [0.016]          [0.000]     [0.000]          [0.001] 
 
Panama 
r  DGF  5% C.V.   LEMBI_M_PANA   LREV_C      INF    LDEBT_X           
 1   1        3.841          1.318                  2.971     11.776          10.982   
                                 [0.251]               [0.085]     [0.001]         [0.001]  
 2   2        5.991         11.760               13.278      20.549         15.019 
                                 [0.003]               [0.001]     [0.000]         [0.001] 
 3   3        7.815         25.313               25.599      34.818         29.224 
                                 [0.000]               [0.000]     [0.000]         [0.000] 
Note: LR-test, Chi-Square(r), P-values in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Long run relationships 
Country   
 
CI(1) CI(2) 
Argentina Inf  
Brazil Lii - 0.18221*Inf + 0.1918*LDebt_X  
Colombia LEmbi_co – 1.0232*LIMACO – 2.4449*Inf  
Chile LEmbi_ch + 0.07898*LDebt_X – 0.2549*Inf  
Mexico Inf  
Ecuador Inf  
Panama -0.79176*Lrev_c +LEmbi_pana 0.61532*Inf +LDebt_X – 0.44483*LRev_c 
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Annex 4. Econometric Results 
  Table 9a. Argentina 
Variable                      Equation                         
Equation 
DLEmbi_arg DLeai Dinf DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_arg_1 0.4745 
(0.0729) 
[6.51] 
0.055 
(0.0178) 
[3.11] 
0.0650 
(0.2797) 
[0.233] 
-0.2536 
(0.084) 
[-3.02] 
DLeai_1 0.2267 
(0.4613) 
[0.492] 
-0.0911 
(0.1127) 
[-0.809] 
1.5977 
(1.769) 
[0.903] 
0.386 
(0.5317) 
[0.727] 
Dinf_1 -0.00607 
(0.0142) 
[-0.426] 
-0.0024 
(0.0034) 
[-0.697] 
-0.1776 
(0.054) 
[-3.35] 
0.0097 
(0.0164) 
[0.593] 
DLDebt_X_1 0.1185 
(0.0876) 
[1.40] 
0.0264 
(0.0207) 
[1.28] 
-0.3997 
(0.3251) 
[-1.23] 
-0.1450 
(0.097) 
[-1.48] 
CI(1)_1* 0.00036 
(0.0111) 
[0.0329] 
0.00144 
(0.00272) 
[0.531] 
-0.3642 
(0.0427) 
[-8.53] 
-0.0088 
(0.0128) 
[-0.69] 
Dum0111p -0.2780 
(0.0689) 
[-4.03] 
-0.0154 
(0.01683) 
[-0.917] 
-0.1857 
(0.2643) 
[-0.703] 
-0.0372 
(0.079) 
[-0.469] 
Dum0202p 0.0959 
(0.07146) 
[1.34] 
0.0027 
(0.0174) 
[0.155] 
1.2090 
(0.2740) 
[4.41] 
-0.0299 
(0.082) 
[-0.364] 
Dum0204p -0.0425 
(0.0707) 
[-0.602] 
0.022 
(0.01728) 
[1.30] 
3.9607 
(0.2713) 
[14.6] 
0.0106 
(0.081) 
[0.13] 
Dum0504p -0.1002 
(0.0694) 
[-1.44] 
0.0100 
(0.0169) 
[0.595] 
-0.5195 
(0.2663) 
[-1.95] 
-0.409 
(0.080) 
[-5.12] 
Dum0810p -0.4681 
(0.0688) 
[-6.80] 
0.0077 
(0.01682) 
[0.459] 
0.0541 
(0.2641) 
[0.205] 
0.073 
(0.079) 
[0.92] 
  Notes: Std-Error are in parenthesis and t-values in brackets. *Argentina: CI(1)= Inf. 
    
   Table 9b. Brazil 
Variable                     Equation       
Equation                         
Equation 
DLEmbi_br DLii Dinf DLDebt__X 
DLEmbi_br_1 0.2413 
(0.0973) 
[2.48] 
-0.3561 
(0.1324) 
[-2.69] 
-0.3595 
(0.3639) 
[-0.988] 
0.6114 
(0.2551) 
[2.40] 
DLEmbi_br_2 -0.0300 
(0.0999) 
[-0.301] 
0.1743 
(0.1359) 
[1.28] 
-0.4834 
(0.3735) 
[-1.29] 
0.1667 
(0.2618) 
[0.637] 
DLii_1 0.0568 
(0.0564) 
[1.01] 
-0.1524 
(0.0768) 
[-1.98] 
-0.4626 
(0.2112) 
[-2.19] 
-0.2911 
(0.148) 
[-1.97] 
DLii_2 0.0645 
(0.0904) 
[0.714] 
0.4152 
(0.1230) 
[3.37] 
-0.3957 
(0.3381) 
[-1.17] 
-0.9867 
(0.2371) 
[-4.16] 
Dinf_1 -0.0102 
(0.0226) 
[-0.451] 
-0.0114 
(0.0308) 
[-0.372] 
-0.3567 
(0.0848) 
[-4.21] 
-0.0522 
(0.0594) 
[-0.879] 
Dinf_2 0.0392 
(0.0209) 
[1.88] 
-0.0917 
(0.0284) 
[-3.23] 
-0.1435 
(0.0781) 
[-1.84] 
0.0879 
(0.0548) 
[1.60] 
DLDebt_X_1 0.0054 
(0.0403) 
[0.136] 
-0.0691 
(0.0592) 
[-1.26] 
0.0793 
(0.1509) 
[0.526] 
-0.3450 
(0.1058) 
[-3.26] 
DLDebt_X_2 0.0655 
(0.0447) 
[1.47] 
0.0508 
(0.0608) 
[0.837] 
0.0320 
(0.1671) 
[0.192] 
-0.2745 
(0.1171) 
[-2.34] 
CI (1)_1* -0.0007 
(0.0440) 
[-0.0172] 
-0.2942 
(0.0598) 
[-4.91] 
0.3610 
(0.1646) 
[2.19] 
0.1442 
(0.1154) 
[1.25] 
CI (1)_2* -0.0605 
(0.0516) 
[-1.17] 
-0.1305 
(0.0702) 
[-1.86] 
0.7434 
(0.1930) 
[3.85] 
0.4920 
(0.1353) 
[3.64] 
Dum0211p 0.1891 
(0.0456) 
[4.15] 
-0.0553 
(0.0620) 
[-0.893] 
1.1154 
(0.1705) 
[6.54] 
0.2762 
(0.1196) 
[2.31] 
Dum0810p -0.1312 
(0.0436) 
[-3.01] 
0.0228 
(0.0593) 
[0.385] 
0.0279 
(0.1630) 
[0.171] 
0.0769 
(0.1143) 
[0.674] 
  Notes: Std-Errors are in parenthesis and t-values in brackets.*Brazil:  CI(1)= Lii - 0.18221*Inf + 0.1918*LDebt_X. 
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Table 9c. Colombia 
Variable                     Equation                          DLEmbi_co      DLIMACO Dinf DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_co_1 0.1520 
(0.095) 
[1.60] 
1.1126 
(0.5134) 
[2.17] 
-1.15585 
(0.7058) 
[-1.64] 
-0.4547 
(0.3327) 
[-1.37] 
DLIMACO_1 -0.01669 
(0.008016) 
[-2.08] 
-0.5392 
(0.0433) 
[-12.5] 
0.037718 
(0.05953) 
[0.634] 
-0.02614 
(0.02806) 
[-0.932] 
Dinf_1 0.01621 
(0.01507) 
[1.08] 
0.1390 
(0.06141) 
[1.71] 
-0.184651 
(0.1119) 
[-1.65] 
-0.03471 
(0.0527) 
[-0.658] 
DLDebt_X_1 0.01487 
(0.02810) 
[0.501] 
-0.3494 
(0.1518) 
[-2.30] 
-0.097537 
(0.2087) 
[-0.467] 
-0.4635 
(0.09839) 
[-4.71] 
CI(1)_1* -0.00061 
(0.00306) 
[-0.202] 
0.1247 
(0.01655) 
[7.54] 
0.03288 
(0.02275) 
[1.45] 
-0.005683 
(0.01072) 
[-0.53] 
Dum0405p -0.1057 
(0.02889) 
[-3.66] 
0.02470 
(0.1561) 
[0.158] 
0.16086 
(0.2145) 
[0.75] 
0.00572 
(0.1011) 
[0.0566] 
Dum0810p -0.1548 
(0.03011) 
[-5.14] 
-0.3675 
(0.1626) 
[-2.26] 
0.5895 
(0.2236) 
[2.64] 
0.028015 
(0.1054) 
[0.266] 
Dum0901p -0.00769 
(0.030) 
[-0.255] 
-0.8094 
(0.1631) 
[-4.96] 
-0.1852 
(0.2243) 
[-0.826] 
0.1348 
(0.1057) 
[1.28] 
Dum0904p 0.02359 
(0.02929) 
[0.805] 
-1.4419 
(0.1582) 
[-9.11] 
-0.02224 
(0.2175) 
[-0.102] 
0.1485 
(0.1025) 
[1.45] 
Dum0907p -0.01486 
(0.03016) 
[-0.493] 
-2.3418 
(0.1629) 
[-14.4] 
0.15916 
(0.2240) 
[0.711] 
0.00464 
(0.1056) 
[0.0440] 
  Notes: Std-Errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Colombia: CI (1)= LEMBI_co – 1.0232*LIMACO – 2.4449*Inf. 
    
Table 9d. Chile 
Variable                     Equation                          DLEmbi_ch DLipi Dinf DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_ch_1 0.1718 
(0.05825) 
[2.94] 
0.1621 
(0.0870) 
[1.86]** 
-0.02261 
(0.8816) 
[-0.025] 
-0.550403 
(0.277) 
[-1.98] 
DLEmbi_ch_2 -0.2627 
(0.08576) 
[-3.06] 
-0.077 
(0.1282) 
[-0.607] 
3.3522 
(1.29) 
[2.58] 
-0.5122 
(0.4687) 
[-1.25] 
DLipi_1 -0.04337 
(0.06714) 
[-0.646] 
-0.3102 
(0.1004) 
[-3.09] 
-0.8168 
(1.016) 
[-0.804] 
0.0184 
(0.3199) 
[0.0578] 
DLipi_2 0.0069 
(0.0639) 
[0.108] 
-0.02408 
(0.09564) 
[-0.252] 
-2.6025 
(0.9682) 
[-2.69] 
-0.153 
(0.3049) 
[-0.505] 
Dinf_1 0.01954 
(0.022) 
[1.74] 
0.01473 
(0.0168) 
[0.877] 
-0.2675 
(0.17) 
[ 1.57] 
-0.1225 
(0.05354) 
[-2.29] 
Dinf_2 -0.001122 
(0.0068) 
[-0.165] 
0.00672 
(0.01017) 
[0.661] 
-0.3613 
(0.1030) 
[-3.51] 
-0.0704 
(0.03242) 
[-2.17] 
DLDebt_X_1 -0.0137 
(0.02486) 
[-0.552] 
-0.02618 
(0.037) 
[-0.704] 
-0.1056 
(0.3762) 
[-0.281] 
-0.6269 
(0.1185) 
[-5.29] 
DLDebt_X_2 -0.0063 
(0.02455) 
[-0.259] 
0.03496 
(0.0367) 
[0.953] 
-0.1842 
(0.3715) 
[-0.496] 
-0.3492 
(0.1170) 
[-2.99] 
CI(1)_1* 0.07855 
(0.02832) 
[2.77] 
0.07911 
(0.0423) 
[1.87] 
0.0655 
(0.4286) 
[0.153] 
-0.300 
(0.1349) 
[-2.23] 
CI(1)_2* -0.0864 
(0.028) 
[-3.09] 
-0.07724 
(0.04188) 
[-1.84] 
0.02834 
(0.4239) 
[0.0669] 
0.2684 
(0.1335) 
[2.01] 
Dum0405p -0.0995 
(0.02329) 
[-4.27] 
-0.0123 
(0.0348) 
[-0.355] 
0.0668 
(0.3524) 
[0.190] 
-0.0393 
(0.111) 
[-0.354] 
Dum0810p -0.1611 
(0.02449) 
[-6.58] 
-0.01164 
(0.0366) 
[-0.318] 
0.0174 
(0.3706) 
[0.0470] 
0.1631 
(0.1167) 
[1.40] 
Dum0901p -0.0058 
(0.02581) 
[-0.225] 
-0.2303 
(0.0385) 
[-5.97] 
-0.5219 
(0.3906) 
[-1.34] 
0.1623 
(0.1230) 
[1.32] 
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Notes: Std-Errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Chile: C(1)= LEMBI_ch + 0.07898*LDebt_X – 
0.2549*Inf . **When non-significant dummies were excluded this coefficient becomes significant.  
  Table 9e . Mexico 
Variable                      Equation                          DLEmbi_mx Dliai Dinf DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_mx_1 0.114 
(0.0761) 
[1.51] 
0.9876 
(11.25) 
[0.087] 
-3.08177 
(1.051) 
[-2.93] 
-0.5085 
(0.3904) 
[-1.30] 
DLEmbi_mx_2 -0.4156 
(0.072) 
[-5.75] 
10.13 
(10.68) 
[0.949] 
0.8405 
(0.9981) 
[0.842] 
-0.4222 
(0.3708) 
[-1.14] 
DLEmbi_mx_3 0.044 
(0.078) 
[0.573] 
29.466 
(11.58) 
[2.54] 
-0.821 
(1.082) 
[-0.759] 
-1.5534 
(0.4019) 
[-3.86] 
DLiai_1 -0.0004 
(0.0007) 
[-0.671] 
-0.800 
(0.1038) 
[-7.71] 
0.02131 
(0.0096) 
[2.20] 
0.0046 
(0.0036) 
[1.28] 
DLiai_2 0.0004 
(0.0008) 
[0.595] 
-0.5716 
(0.1212) 
[-4.72] 
0.02077 
(0.01132) 
[1.84] 
0.002755 
(0.0042) 
[0.655] 
DLiai_3 0.0001 
(0.0007) 
[0.24] 
-0.3033 
(0.1043) 
[-2.91] 
0.0079 
(0.0097) 
[0.811] 
-0.001739 
(0.0036) 
[-0.481] 
Dinf_1 -0.0059 
(0.0038) 
[-1.52] 
1.3309 
(0.576) 
[2.31] 
-0.170217 
(0.053) 
[-3.16] 
-0.0244 
(0.020) 
[-1.22] 
Dinf_2 0.0092 
(0.0041) 
[2.22] 
-0.5244 
(0.6138) 
[-0.854] 
0.0037 
(0.057) 
[0.066] 
-0.0099 
(0.021) 
[-0.468] 
Dinf_3 0.00178 
(0.0071) 
[0.249] 
0.4255 
(1.057) 
[0.403] 
0.2831 
(0.098) 
[2.87] 
0.0252 
(0.036) 
[0.688] 
DLDebt_X_1 -0.008 
(0.020) 
[-0.388] 
-4.969 
(3.044) 
[-1.63] 
0.266 
(0.2844) 
[0.938] 
-0.2910 
(0.1056) 
[-2.76] 
DLDebt_X_2 0.0114 
(0.021) 
[0.526] 
-6.9052 
(3.202) 
[-2.16] 
1.30024 
(0.2991) 
[4.35] 
0.03249 
(0.111) 
[0.292] 
DLDebt_X_3 0.02932 
(0.021) 
[1.35] 
-11.0014 
(3.202) 
[-3.44] 
0.0677 
(0.2991) 
[0.227] 
0.134 
(0.111) 
[1.21] 
CI(1)_1* -0.0007 
(0.004) 
[-0.175] 
1.2099 
(0.6641) 
[1.82] 
-0.4262 
(0.06204) 
[-6.87] 
0.0206 
(0.023) 
[0.895] 
CI(1)_2* 0.0051 
(0.0036) 
[1.40] 
-0.121 
(0.543) 
[-0.223] 
-0.2560 
(0.050) 
[-5.05] 
0.04502 
(0.018) 
[2.39] 
CI(1)_3* -0.0040 
(0.0054) 
[-0.741] 
0.4043 
(0.8094) 
[0.498] 
-0.2598 
(0.075) 
[-3.44] 
0.055 
(0.028) 
[1.96] 
Dum0405p -0.06056 
(0.0166) 
[-3.64] 
-2.34 
(2.46) 
[-0.955] 
-0.199 
(0.2298) 
[-0.868] 
-0.0531 
(0.085) 
[-0.623] 
Dum0810p -0.1394 
(0.016) 
[-8.56] 
-0.577 
(2.407) 
[-0.24] 
0.07348 
(0.2249) 
[0.327] 
-0.0255 
(0.083) 
[-0.305] 
    Notes: Std-Errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Mexico: C(1) = Inf.  
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  Table 9f. Ecuador 
Variable                           Equation                          DLEmbi_ec DLeai Dinf DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_ec_1 0.2528 
(0.072) 
[3.50] 
-0.086 
(0.1061) 
[-0.819] 
-0.0027 
(0.0039) 
[-0.700] 
-0.2698 
(0.1149) 
[-2.35] 
DLeai_1 -0.031 
(0.0604) 
[-0.527] 
-0.6107 
(0.088) 
[-6.88] 
-0.0080 
(0.0033) 
[-2.42] 
0.0937 
(0.096) 
[0.0976] 
Dinf_1 1.0619 
(1.017) 
[1.04] 
-0.1161 
(1.493) 
[-0.077] 
-0.1312 
(0.055) 
[-2.35] 
-1.504 
(1.616) 
[-0.931] 
DLDebt_X_1 0.125 
(0.0613) 
[2.04] 
-0.0820 
(0.089) 
[-0.911] 
0.0009 
(0.0033) 
[0.273] 
-0.2481 
(0.097) 
[-2.55] 
CI(1)_1* -0.6925 
(1.073) 
[-0.645] 
0.0627 
(1.575) 
[0.0399] 
-0.4235 
(0.059) 
[-7.17] 
-0.7155 
(1.705) 
[-0.42] 
Dum0109p 0.0125 
(0.0569) 
[0.221] 
0.0596 
(0.083) 
[0.714] 
0.013 
(0.0031) 
[4.22] 
-0.089 
(0.09) 
[-0.987] 
Dum0301p 0.083 
(0.056) 
[1.46] 
0.0077 
(0.083) 
[0.0931] 
0.017 
(0.0031) 
[5.43] 
0.0109 
(0.09) 
[0.121] 
Dum0810p -0.4618 
(0.058) 
[-7.93] 
-0.1432 
(0.0854) 
[-1.68] 
-0.0047 
(0.0032) 
[-1.49] 
0.200 
(0.092) 
[2.16] 
Dum0811p -0.4984 
(0.065) 
[-7.62] 
-0.0083 
(0.096) 
[-0.08] 
-0.0071 
(0.0035) 
[-1.97] 
0.0721 
(0.1039) 
[0.69] 
Dum0906p 0.1389 
(0.056) 
[2.46] 
-0.0377 
(0.082) 
[-0.455] 
-0.0007 
(0.0031) 
[-0.257] 
-0.410 
(0.089) 
[-4.92] 
   Note: Std-Errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Ecuador: CI(1)= Inf_1. 
    
   Table 9g. Panama 
Variable                           Equation                          DLEmbi_pa 
 
DLrev_c Dinf 
 
DLDebt_X 
DLEmbi_pa_1 0.2995 
(0.074) 
[4.00] 
0.04671 
(0.1630) 
[0.287] 
3.8661 
(1.595) 
[2.42] 
-0.4881 
(0.6171) 
[-0.791] 
DLrev_c_1 -0.0387 
(0.0456) 
[-0.849] 
-0.1722 
(0.0992) 
[-1.74] 
0.7122 
(0.9714) 
[0.733] 
0.1170 
(0.3757) 
[0.311] 
Dinf_1 -0.0058 
(0.0043) 
[-1.33] 
-0.0228 
(0.0095) 
[-2.40] 
-0.2284 
(0.093) 
[-2.45] 
0.0769 
(0.036) 
[2.14] 
DLDebt_X_1 -0.00147 
(0.01302) 
[-0.113] 
0.0337 
(0.02832) 
[1.19] 
0.6640 
(0.2772) 
[2.40] 
-0.0085 
(0.1072) 
[-0.919] 
CI(1)_1* -0.0988 
(0.028) 
[-3.51] 
0.1816 
(0.0612) 
[2.97] 
-0.0633 
(0.5992) 
[-0.106] 
-0.1927 
(0.2318) 
[-0.832] 
CI(2)_1* 0.0067 
(0.0092) 
[0.737] 
0.00694 
(0.0200) 
[0.346] 
-0.9952 
(0.1964) 
[-5.07] 
-0.2118 
(0.0759) 
[-2.79] 
Dum0401p 0.02503 
(0.02011) 
[1.25] 
-0.00535 
(0.0437) 
[-0.122] 
-1.9271 
(0.4283) 
[-4.50] 
0.3987 
(0.1656) 
[2.41] 
Dum0810p -0.1819 
(0.0202) 
[-8.99] 
0.0221 
(0.044) 
[0.0502] 
-0.4506 
(0.4310) 
[-1.05] 
0.1666 
(0.1667) 
[1.00] 
Note: Std-Errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Panama: CI(1)= -0.79176*Lrev_c +LEmbi_pana and CI(2)=0.61532*Inf +LDebt_X – 
0.44483*LRev_c 
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Table 10. Comparative analysis taking only the significant coefficients into account 
Variable Argentina Brazil Colombia Chile Mexico Ecuador Panama 
Dependent variable:  DLEMBI_specific_country 
DLEMBI X X  X X X X 
DLEAI   X     
DINF     X   
DLDEBT_X      X  
DUM0810 X X X X X X X 
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Note: The results shown are the ones obtained when non-significant dummies were eliminated.  CI(): Specifies only the variables included in each long 
run relationship, which are described in Table 8. *This variable changes depending on the country (see Table 4). **When non-significant dummies were 
excluded this coefficient becomes significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DUM0405   X X X   
CI()    X    X (CI(1)) 
Dependent variable:  DLEAI*  
DLEMBI X X X     X(**) X   
DLEAI  X X X X X  
DINF  X   X  X 
DDEBT_X   X  X   
DUM0810   X     
DUM0901   X X    
CI()   X    X(CI(1)) 
Dependent variable:  DINF   X    X (CI_1) 
DLEMBI    X X  X 
DLEAI  X  X X X  
DINF X X  X X X X 
DLDEBT_X     X  X 
DUM0810   X     
CI() X X    X  X X (CI(2)) 
Dependent variable:  DLDEBT_X 
DLEMBI X X  X X X  
DLEAI  X      
DINF    X   X 
DLDEBT_X  X X X X X  
DUM0810      X  
CI()  X  X X  X (CI(2)) 
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